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Abstract The decentralized approach to security administration in new computing environments
(e.g., pervasive computing and mobile environments) is based on apportioning the environment into
multiple security domains. The security policies of each security domain are specified by an authority
and enforced by a security agent. The requirements of cooperative administration in such Multi-Security-
Domain (MSD) environments, for shared or subdomains, induced us to propose an MSD cooperation
framework within a logical security policy language (called MASL) in this paper. MASL is a variation of
deontic logic that enables multiple authorities to specify their domain policies, including obligations and
authorizations. The proposed supplement to MASL, as a calculus of cooperative administration, enables
the security agents to infer applicable policy rules of cooperative domains from the policy rules of the
participating domains. The calculus offers three styles of cooperative administration, namely collaborative,
disjunctive, and delegative. The syntax, semantics, proof theory, soundness and completeness proofs of the
core MASL and its supplement are formally presented in this paper. The main advantages of the proposed
logical approach in cooperative administration of MSD environments are its abstraction, expressiveness,
scalability, and applicability, and automated inference of the cooperative domains’ policies.
© 2012 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In new computing environments, major efforts are being
devoted to extending the accessibility of information and
resources. This leads to more distributed computing and
resource sharing. The growth of wireless communications and
wireless networks, as well as the increased mobility of users
and resources, are the results of such a tendency. With the
increase in accessibility of information and resources, providing
security becomes a more complicated problem compared to
that in legacy centralized environments. Characteristics of
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doi:10.1016/j.scient.2011.10.004new computing environments, such as openness, dynamicity,
heterogeneity, distribution and extensive use of mobile and
non-mobile weak powered devices, impose new security
requirements that are not considered in traditional security
models and frameworks.
The distribution of resources in such environments encour-
ages us to employ a decentralized approach to security admin-
istration and management. In this approach, the environment
is divided into a number of security domains based on different
factors like geographical situation, organizational ownership of
resources, or coverage limitations in cellular networks and ser-
vices. For each security domain, there is a security agentwith an
administrator (we call it authority). Each resource, such as a ser-
vice, can register itself in one or more domains. The authorities
are responsible for specifying security policies in the security
domains, and the security agents have the duty of enforcing the
security policies stated by the authorities to preserve the secu-
rity and privacy of resources registered in the domains.
The security issue in Multi-Security-Domain (MSD) envi-
ronments is intensified when resources are shared among
different security domains. For example, in Grid computing
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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Virtual Organizations (VOs), including groups of individuals and
their required resources and services, united by a common pur-
pose, but not located within a single security administrative
domain [1]. The main security issue in this situation is how
to manage the shared resources within different security do-
mains. Another application of resource sharing within multiple
security domains is to have a hierarchical management struc-
ture on resources within an organization, providing a common
service for multiple domains. A proper approach for security
administration in this situation is a cooperative management
approach, which is proposed in this paper based on a logi-
cal infrastructure. Cooperativemanagement, which is inherited
fromManagement Science [2], enables us to involve all authori-
ties of related security domains in the security decision-making
process.
The advantages of using logics in security policy specifica-
tion and inference are their clean foundation, flexibility, sepa-
ration of policies from implementation mechanisms (which is
important in heterogeneous distributed systems), expressive-
ness (it is possible to describe policies at a reasonable level of
abstraction), preciseness (users can express policies precisely
using a logic language) and verifiability [3–5]. The require-
ment of policy specification in different domains by different
authorities in MSD environments motivated us to propose a
multi-authority type of deontic logic to specify security policies,
including obligation policies, as well as authorization ones.
Based on this logical platform, the issue of cooperative security
administration on shared or subdomains in MSD environments
is resolved by supplementing the proposed logic by some ax-
ioms for inferring cooperative security policies based on the se-
curity policies of participating domains. The axioms promoted
are based on three styles of cooperative administration: collab-
orative, disjunctive and delegative.
The technique used in this paper for cooperative security
administration is based on the concept of composite authority.
A composite authority is a virtual authority for cooperative
domains (might be shared or subdomains), which is a
representative of primitive authorities participating in the
cooperative administration based on one of the aforementioned
cooperative administration styles. The axioms that enable
us to infer the security policies specified by the composite
authorities, as well as the semantics of the proposed syntax
and soundness proof of the logical system, are presented in this
paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We first con-
tinue the paper by introducing other related research in the
next section. Our proposed framework for cooperation in MSD
environments, accompanied by the formal definition of MSD
and cooperative domains, is presented in Section 3. The syntax,
semantics andproof theory of the core ofMASL (as our proposed
logical policy language) are presented in Section 4. The sup-
plementary part of MASL that enables security agents to apply
cooperative security administration is presented in Section 5
in the form of the three aforementioned cooperative adminis-
tration styles. Essential properties of the proposed logical lan-
guage, including soundness and completeness properties, are
discussed in Section 6. Section 7 proposes an architecture for
security agents and explains how to enforce the security poli-
cies in this architecture. In Section 8, we present an application
example of the proposed logical model and its cooperative se-
curity administration approach. Finally, in the last section, we
conclude the paper and present a short discussion about the
characteristics of our proposed approach to cooperative secu-
rity administration in MSD environments.2. Related work
Decentralized security administration in new computing en-
vironments, such as pervasive computing environments [6] and
the semantic web [7], may require apportioning the environ-
ment into multiple security domains. A multiple security do-
main approach to security administration is introduced in some
papers to split the environment into several administration do-
mains, in order to make distributed security administration
possible. Some examples are introduced as follows. This con-
cept is used in [8] as a security framework in a pervasive com-
puting environment. In each domain, a security agent (called
Virgin) works as a proxy of services in the domain, and controls
the requested accesses to the resources and services.
In Multi-Security-Domain (MSD) environments, due to re-
source sharing or required collaborative activities, cooperative
administration is a fundamental security requirement. Pearl-
man et al. in [9] introduce Virtual Organizations (VO) and vir-
tual communities, in which collaborative activities are made
possible through resource sharing among multiple institutions.
They address policy specification and enforcement inVOs as key
problems in these environments.
With the growing usage of distributed and pervasive com-
puting, different approaches for security administration in
these environments, through multiple security domains, have
been investigated. In some of these investigations, the char-
acteristics of the cooperative administration (i.e., cooperative
policy specification and enforcement) have been taken into ac-
count and partial solutions have been proposed for its existence
in an environment. Some of these investigations are as follows.
The multi-domain approach is used in [10,11] for mobile
computing environments in controlling users’ access to services
in different domains. Au et al. in [10] introduced one-shot
authorization tokens for efficient access control in a cross-
domain multi-application environment. This token is actually
a form of static capability that is used once and is updated after
each access. Using one-shot tokens, the authorization agent of
a client can get access to application servers of local (home)
or foreign domains by communicating with the centralized
authorization server of the destination domain [11]. In this
architecture, clients (users) must be authenticated by their
identity to their local (home) domains. In fact, for the first
time, they are authorized to their intended foreign domains as
the result of negotiations made in advance between their local
authorization server and that of their foreign destination.
Two architectural configurations for multi-domain environ-
ments are introduced by Joshi et al. in [12]: loosely-coupled
multi-domain environments and federated multi-domain en-
vironments. In a loosely-coupled multi-domain environment,
independent domains (for example some companies) dynami-
cally come together to share their resources, e.g. their informa-
tion. However, in a federated multi-domain environment, one
domain is designated as a master, and the others are local or
subdomains. In fact, themastermediates access to the resources
of subdomains through a global policy. Joshi et al. also proposed
the XML Role-Based Access Control (X-RBAC) specification lan-
guage for the aforementioned multi-domain environments.
X-RBAC extends the RBAC model by adding a credential-based
role assignment and determining context constraints on roles
and access requirements. In this language, cooperation among
domains becomes possible by specifying mediation policies.
X-RABC languagewas extended to include temporal constraints
(e.g., specifying when and how long) on inter-domain accesses
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straints is introduced in the Generalized Temporal Role-Based
Access Control (GTRBAC) model [14]. The composition of local
security policies of domains in this model in order to obtain a
global policy may create some conflicts among the RBAC poli-
cies of individual domains, which are resolved in [15].
Tang et al. [16] introduced the MSD environment as a
multi-factor, dynamic, heterogeneous and open environment.
They proposed a mobile access control architecture for these
environments in which two access control mechanisms are
provided: direct access control for accessing mobile users to
security domains and inter-domain access control for resource
sharing or collaboration among security domains.
Demchenko et al., in [17], present a domain-based Role-
Based Access Control Model (RBAC-DM) as an extension to the
classical RBAC model for distributed collaborative applications.
This model supports distributed hierarchical management in
collaborative environments (such as virtual organizations or
virtual labs), security context management, and dynamic role
assignment, based on specific domain restrictions that can in-
clude delegation or the principle of minimum privileges. Al-
though this model is presented for collaborative environments,
it does not consider the cooperation approach in security man-
agement and administration of shared domains in these envi-
ronments.
Tang et al. propose another approach to secure interoper-
ation of domains in [18]. For an external user to access a lo-
cal domain through an external domain, an inter-domain policy
mapping is required. This is realized in this approach by the role
mapping between the roles of the external domain and those of
the local domain. It is also possible to apply time constraints in
this role mapping.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an MSD
cooperation framework and introduce a cooperative domain in
the framework, which enables the cooperative administration
of shared or subdomains by automatic derivation of security
policy rules. For automatic policy inference, a variation
of deontic logic (multi-authority version of typed deontic
logic) is introduced to provide a platform for multiple
authorities to specify security policies in multiple security
domains, abstracted away from the implementation details. The
automatic policy derivation eliminates manual efforts in policy
composition for cooperative domains, which is proposed in
different forms (e.g., mediation policies and global policies) in
related papers.
The use of logic to tackle the problems of specifying and
proving the security of distributed systems began in 1988 by
Glasgow et al. [19]. Since then, various sorts of logic, including
first-order logic, stratified logic (such as Horn clauses), modal
logic (including temporal logic, epistemic logic, and deontic
logic) andnon-monotonic logic (such as default logic) have been
used to model user beliefs and inference abilities, specification
of security policies, context and temporal constraints and
historical interactions in distributed environments, such as
pervasive computing or ubiquitous environments.
The access control logic, proposed by Abadi et al. [5],
provides a logical system (based on the modal logic) for
specifying composite principals, access control lists and access
delegation in distributed systems. The first attempt at providing
a general logical framework for authorization was made by
Woo and Lam in [20]. They proposed the use of default
logic, which is a kind of non-monotonic logic, to specify
authorization policies. The undecidability of the logic proposed
by Woo and Lam motivated Jajodia et al. [21,22] to define anAuthorization Specification Language (ASL), based on stratified
first-order logic, which is not only decidable but also linear.
Barker and Stuckey [23] took a similar approach to the
specification of multiple types of policies (with emphasis on
RBAC policies) using stratified Horn-clauses logic. The freedom
in using constrained negation in this language, in comparison
with ASL [22], encouraged the authors to leverage a partial-
deduction approach to specializing access control on deductive
databases in [24]. Kushik et al. [25] introduced a Constraint
Logic Programming (CLP) based framework to determine access
to partial or full ontologies in order to preserve confidentiality
in the open World Wide Web. In this framework, policies
are CLP programs (which are stratified Horn clauses with
constructive negation) that prevent the disclosure of sensitive
portions of an ontology by renaming or hiding some concepts
or relationships.
We propose and use a multi-authority version of deontic
logic in this paper. The use of deontic logic in access control was
considered by Cuppens and Demolombe [26] in combination
with other types of modal logic like epistemic logic (to
represent users’ knowledge) and temporal logic (to represent
the dynamic progress of systems over time), to specify what
a user is permitted to know (information flow control). Kagal
et al. proposed a policy language called Rei [27] based on
Semantic Web languages (RDF and DAML + OIL) for pervasive
computing environments. In Rei, concepts of deontic logic, like
permission, obligation and prohibition, were used. However,
this policy language does not support multiple authorities’
policy specifications or cooperative administration, which are
considered in our paper.
The problem of composition of access control policies
specified by different authorities is addressed in [28–30]
for combining access control policies to be fed into an
access control system. The main drawback of their approach
is that it is not clear how authorities determine their
strategies for combining access control policies, which makes
them inapplicable in practice. Furthermore, they just address
authorization policies. In this paper, we enable authorities to
specify conditional as well as obligation authorization, and
also to determine different strategies for their different shared
domains inMSD environments (through negotiationwith other
participating authorities). In this way, all policies applicable
to the resources that exist in the shared domains can be
inferred only by determining the cooperative administration
style (or administration strategy) by the authorities of the
shared domain. In fact, the logical axiomatic system in this
approach handles how to infer the applicable policies. Note
that, not considering authorization policies in conjunction with
those of obligation may result in inconsistencies in the security
policy specification.
3. Multi-Security-Domain (MSD) environments
New computing environments tend to be decentralized and
try to share all their resourceswith each other through different
communication channels. For example, in pervasive computing
environments, resources like information and services are
accessible anywhere and anytime via any device. As another
example, we can consider using mobile technologies for
accessing resources by moving across different organizational
domains andhaving collaborationwithin or between them [16].
In these environments, users may access resources and
services in different domains. There are different sorts of user
for existing shared resources and not all users are known and
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of resources, as well as users not known to the particular
resource manager, force us to employ a decentralized security
administration. In this approach, the environment is divided
into a number of domains based on different factors like
geographical situation or organizational structure. For each
domain, there is a security agent with an administrator (we call
it authority) and each resource, like a service, can register itself
in one or more domains. Thus, an authority is responsible for
specifying security policy rules for resources (objects) that are
registered in the authority’s associated domain.
Definition 3.1 (Security Domain (SD)). A security domain is a
set of objects (resources), an authority who specifies security
policies over the objects, and a set of specified (explicit) and
inferred (implicit) security policy rules.
Note that each SD has a Security Agent (SA), which enforces
the SD’s security policy rules. Since the SA does not have any
role in defining an SD, we omit it from the SD definition.
An SD might be an individual domain in which the authority
is primitive, or it might be a cooperative domain where
the authority is the composition of primitive authorities of
participating individual domains. By the definition of security
domains, a Multi-Security-Domain (MSD) environment is
defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Multi-Security-Domain (MSD) Environment). A
set of individual and cooperative security domains constitute
a Multi Security Domain (MSD) environment.
Cooperative security administration in an MSD environ-
ment is only possible over the cooperative domains. In fact,
the type of composition of primitive authorities in forming an
authority for a cooperative domain is a function of the coop-
erative administration style agreed upon by the participating
domains.3.1. MSD cooperation framework
In an MSD environment, there are many electronic devices
and resources that are accessible anywhere and at any time.
Each resource in this environment is registered in at least one
SD. The overall framework of an MSD environment and its
cooperation structure is depicted in Figure 1. The authorities,
u1 and u2, are primitive authorities and their domains are
individual domains. The authority (u1 & u2) is a composite
authority for the shared domain of u1 and u2. As demonstrated
in this figure, there are security policy rules in each domain that
are stated by the domain’s authority using the MASL language.
MASL is introduced in Section 4.
The Security Agent (SA) of each SD is responsible for
enforcing security policy rules on the domain’s resources.
To this end, the SA might need to interact with other
SAs. For interaction between domains’ SAs, an inter-domain
interaction channel is provided in the proposed framework.
For example, the SA of u1’s domain, in order to control
requested accesses to the printer (which is shared with u2’s
domain), must have interaction with (u1 & u2)’s domain. Note
that in the real implementation, due to the virtuality of the
composite authority (u1 & u2), we do not need to have a real
security agent for this shared domain. In fact, the security
agent of each u1’s and u2’s domain can infer and enforce
cooperative administration of their shared resources based on
the agreement they previously made with each other. More
details on cooperative administration (based on composite
authorities’ policy inference) is presented in Section 5.
We also propose an architecture for SAs to enforce security
policy rules (specified by its domain’s authority). The proposed
architecture is compatible with OASIS’s XACML [31] and ITU-
T [32] standard security frameworks. The proposed architecture
for an SA (presented in Section 7.1) enables the SA to verify user
certificates, do inference over specified security policy rules
M. Amini et al. / Scientia Iranica, Transactions D: Computer Science & Engineering and Electrical Engineering 19 (2012) 635–653 639(using MASL language), and enforce inferred authorization, as
well as obligation security policy rules. Note that SAs play the
role of a proxy for domain resources, and control the accesses.
Thus, there is not any computational cost for resources that are,
in most cases, low power.
Authorities require negotiation to cooperatewith each other
and reach an agreement on their cooperative administration
style. Inter-domain negotiation is possible in this framework
through the negotiation channel, which is mergedwith the SA’s
interaction channel.
Although we explain more on the implementation details
of security agents in Section 7, we do not consider other
implementation details of the proposed framework. Some
important implementation aspects that should be considered
are as follows:
• Securing communication channels using an infrastructure
like PKI (Public-Key Infrastructure) [33] between domains
and light cryptographic algorithms like [34] betweenmobile
users and the SA, and also between devices or resources and
the SA.
• Attribute certificates (credentials) for users or subjects
and their required infrastructures, such as PMI (Privilege
Management Infrastructure) [33] or SPKI/SDSI (Simplified
PKI/Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure) [35].
• Credential fetching mechanisms for credential based autho-
rization, e.g. pulling and pushing mechanisms [36,37].
• Mechanisms for communicating with PMI or SPKI/SDSI
components for certificate validation;
• Appropriate negotiation mechanism for inter-domain nego-
tiation on cooperative security administration styles for co-
operative domains.
3.2. Formal model of MSD
Following the narrative description of an MSD environment
(in Section 3.1), our proposed formal model of an MSD is as
follows.
Definition 3.3 (Formal Model of MSD). A formal model of an
MSD is 3-tuple (FDS, SDS, OPR) in which:
• FDS = (S,O, A,DS, CX, AU): Fundamental data set of the
model that contains the following sets:
– Sets of subjects (S), objects or resources (O), and actions
or operations (A) on resources;
– Set of deontic statuses (DS = {OB (obligatory that), PE
(permissible that), IM (impermissible that), GR (gratuitous
that)});
– Set of authorities (AU), which contains primitive authori-
ties (PAU), as well as composite authorities (CAU), which
are obtained by the calculus of composite authorities (de-
scribed in the next section);
– Set of contextual propositions (CX).
• SDS: A set of security domains, which might be individual
domains or cooperative domains. Each Security Domain (SD)
is defined formally later in this section.
• OPR = {AddPolicyRule, RevokePolicyRule, ADF}: A set of
operations that are required by the authority and Security
Agent (SA) of an SD. AddPolicyRule and RevokePolicyRule
are used by authorities to add and revoke a security policy
rule, respectively. ADF is an access decision function that is
used by SAs to infer and enforce authorization policy rules.Based on the narrative definition of SDs in the previous
section, the formal model of an SD is defined as follows. The
definitions of different types of cooperative SD (based on the
different styles of cooperative administration) are presented in
Section 5.
Definition 3.4 (Formal Model of SD). The security domain of an
authority, ui, is formally modeled as a triple, denoted by SDui =
(ui,Oi, SPRui), where ui ∈ AU is the authority,Oi ⊆ O is a subset
of objects or resources registered in the domain, and SPRui is a
set of local security policy rules specified by the authority, ui,
using MASL security policy language.
By the above formal definition of SDs, a security domain,
SDui = (ui,Oi, SPRui), is a subdomain of security domain SDuj =
(uj,Oj, SPRuj) if, and only if, Oi ⊆ Oj. A security domain SDuk is
the shared domain of security domains, SDui and SDuj if and only
if Ok = Oi ∩ Oj.
A security domain like SDui is called an individual domain
if ui is a primitive authority (i.e., ui ∈ PAU) and it is called a
cooperative domain if it is a shared or sub domain and ui is a
composite authority (i.e., ui ∈ CAU).
4. MASL: a logical security policy language
Requirements such as policy inference for cooperative
domains, independence of security policy specification from
implementation details of underlying real environments and
distributed nature of MSD environments encouraged us to
establish a variation of the deontic logical language for
the specification and inference of security policy rules by
authorities and security agents in security domains. MASL
(multi-authority security policy language), which is presented
in this paper, is a many-sorted type of multi-authority version
of deontic logic. It enables multiple authorities to specify
authorization as well as obligation policies. Statements like ‘‘it is
obligatory that’’ (denoted by OB), ‘‘permissible that’’ (denoted
by PE), ‘‘impermissible that’’ (denoted by IM) and ‘‘gratuitous
that’’ (denoted by GR) can be specified by this logic. In the rest
of this section, the syntax, semantics, and proof theory of the
core of MASL are presented. The supplementary part of MASL,
which enables us to infer policy rules for cooperative domains,
is presented in Section 5, accompanied by the description of
different styles of cooperative security administration.
4.1. Syntax of MASL
To define the syntax of the MASL logical language and to
introduce the logical template of security policy rules, we need
to define the alphabet and sentences (formulas) of our logical
language. The alphabet of MASL is as follows:
• A definite set of sorts or typesΣ . Since types are interpreted
as sets, existence of a subtype relationship, which is
interpreted as a subset relationship, is inevitable [38]. For
sake of simplicity, we suppose that the types with a subtype
relationship construct a lattice. Supremum and infimum
types in this lattice are denoted by σ⊤ and σ⊥, respectively.
Note that we do not formalize subtype relationships in our
logic.
• Two constant symbolsT (true), andF (contradiction or false).
• A set of context and conditional propositions; x0, x1, . . . , xk.• A set of names (terms) t0: σ0, t1: σ1, . . . , tl: σl, where each
term, ti, is of sort σi ∈ Σ .• A set of context and conditional n-ary predicate symbols
(n > 0), such as p of sort (σ1, . . . , σn), where σi ∈ Σ .
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. . . , ut and composite authorities (CAU) resulted from
composing the primitive ones (using &, |, and ◃ operators
that are introduced later).
• Deontic status symbols, including OB, PE, IM, and GR.
• Thepropositional primitive relaters,∧,¬ (Wemayuse other
abbreviations like ∨,→, and↔).
• Auxiliary symbols (, and).
Using the above alphabets, the sentences of the language are
formulas that are defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Formula). A formula is defined inductively as
follows:
• Every proposition of form xi is an atomic formula.• T and F are atomic formulae.
• If p: (σ1, . . . , σn) is an n-ary predicate symbol and t1: σ1′, t2 :
σ2
′, . . . , tn: σn′ are terms, where σi′ is subtype of σi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, then p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) is an atomic formula.• If αi and αj are formulas, then so are (αi ∧ αj) and ¬αi and
analogously (αi ∨ αj), (αi → αj) and (αi ↔ αj).• If ds is a deontic status, u is an authority (primitive or
composite) and α is a formula, then (dsuα) is a formula.
Notice that the parentheses are used to ensure that the
syntax is completely unambiguous. However, in this paper, we
are not strict regarding use of parentheses when the formula
is clear to the reader. In this definition, dsuα intuitively means
that an authority, u, declares that the status, ds, is established
for α. For example, OBuα means u states that ‘‘it is obligatory
(necessary) for α to hold’’.
In the above definition, the syntactical details of composite
authorities are eliminated. The definition of a composite
authority can be found in Section 5.
4.2. Proof theory of MASL
The core axioms and inference rules of MASL are as follows.
The axioms for the composition of authorities are presented in
the next section as a supplement to the core logical system for
cooperative administration.
A1. If p is a tautology (over our language), then ⊢ p (TAUT)
A2. ⊢ OBu(p → q)→ (OBup → OBuq) (OB-MK)
A3. ⊢ OBup → ¬OBu¬p (OB-MD)
A4. ⊢ PEup ↔ ¬OBu¬p (PE-Def)
A5. ⊢ IMup ↔ OBu¬p (IM-Def)
A6. ⊢ GRup ↔ ¬OBup (GR-Def)
A*. All axioms of the calculus of composite authorities in
Section 5.
R1. If ⊢ p and ⊢ p → q, then ⊢ q (MP)
R2. If ⊢ p then ⊢ OBup. (OB-MO)
Axiom A1 (TAUT) subsumes propositional logic within our
logic. Axiom A2 (OB-MK) states that if an authority, u, states
that a condition is obligatory, and its antecedent is obligatory
from u’s viewpoint, then the consequence is obligatory from
u’s viewpoint as well. Axiom A3 (OB-MD) says that if u states
that p is obligatory, then its negation is not obligatory from
u’s viewpoint. The axioms A4–A6 define the deontic statuses,
PE, IM, and GR, based on the OB (obligation) status. We can
easily take one of these four statuses as a primitive and
define the others. Axiom A* includes all axioms introduced
for composite authorities (for cooperative administration) in
Section 5. Inference rule R1 (MP) is the Modus–Ponens rule.
Inference rule R2 (OB-MO) states that if something is a theorem,then its obligation from any authority’s point of view is also a
theorem.
Definition 4.2 (Provability). The set of provable formulae in
MASL is the smallest set, Γ , such that:
• Each instance of every introduced axiom schema are in Γ .
• Γ is closed under the introduced inference rules.
Each member, α, of provable set Γ is a provable formula or a
theorem and is denoted by ⊢ α.
Definition 4.3 (Consistency). A set Γ of formulae in MASL is
inconsistent iff there are α1, . . . , αn ∈ Γ such that⊢ (α1∧· · ·∧
αn)→ F; otherwise, Γ is consistent.
By the definition of consistency, we say that a formula α is
derivable from set Γ of formulae in MASL (denoted by Γ ⊢ α)
iff Γ ∪ {¬α} is inconsistent.
4.3. Semantics of MASL
A popular approach in presenting semantics for a modal
logic (such as deontic logic) is to use a Kripkemodel. To present
the semantics of the proposed logic, we use a Kripke structure
in which the domain of objects and the interpretation of names
and predicates are included. Note that in this paper, quantifiers
(like universal and existential ones) are from meta language,
and they do not belong to MASL language.
A Kripke-style structure of the proposed logic is a 5-tuple of
the formM = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ)where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds (possible situa-
tions). In our application, each world is a global authorized
protection state in the environment.
• R is an interpretation function that maps each authority
to a binary relation on W . This binary relation is called
the deontic alternativeness or acceptability relation for an
authority, ui. A world w′ is acceptable from another world
w from ui’s point of view, if and only if, the world w′
is normatively compatible with the world w from ui’s
security point of view. This mapping function for primitive
authorities is defined as r = AU → P (W × W ) and for
composite authorities is defined as an extension on r , which
is presented in Section 5 (R is an extension of r). Each relation
r(u) must be serial, i.e. for all u ∈ AU:∀w ∈ W : ∃w′ ∈
W , w′ ∈ r(u)(w). We need this property to validate the OB-
MD axiom.
• ∆ is a non-empty set of objects in all worlds of W . We
assume that all possible worlds have the same domain of
objects.
• J:Σ → P (∆)maps each sort σ inΣ to a nonempty subset
of domain∆, which is denoted by∆σ . In otherwords, J(σ ) =
∆σ ⊆ ∆. Note that if σ1 is subtype of σ2, then,∆σ1 ⊆ ∆σ2 .• I is an interpretation function that in each world w
assigns to every name (term) t: σ , a set of objects in ∆σ ,
i.e. I(w)(t: σ) = [t]Iw ⊆ ∆σ , and to every predicate symbol
p: (σ1, . . . , σn), an n-ary relation on∆σ1 ×∆σ2 × · · · ×∆σn ,
i.e. I(w)(p: (σ1, . . . , σn)) = [p]Iw ⊆ ∆σ1 ×∆σ2 × · · · ×∆σn .
This function must satisfy the limitation that the
interpretation of a name (term) must be identical in all
worlds, i.e. for allw,w′ ∈ W : I(w)(t : σ) = I(w′)(t : σ).
• Φ is an interpretation function that maps each formula
to a subset of possible worlds in which the formula is
correct. This function for propositions is defined by φ =
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defined inductively as follows:
Φ(x) = φ(x), if x is a proposition,
Φ(T) = W ,
Φ(F) = ∅,








Φ(¬α) = W − Φ(α),
Φ(α ∧ α′) = Φ(α) ∩ Φ(α′),
Φ(OBuα) = {w|R(u)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)},
Φ(IMuα) = {w|R(u)(w) ⊆ Φ(¬α)},
Φ(PEuα) = {w|R(u)(w) ∩ Φ(α) ≠ ∅},
Φ(GRuα) = {w|R(u)(w) ∩ Φ(¬α) ≠ ∅}.
Definition 4.4 (Truth). A formula, α, in a model,M = (W , R,
∆, J, I,Φ), is true at a worldw ∈ W , denoted Mw α, if and only
if,w ∈ Φ(α). Analogously, α is not true at theworldw, denoted
2Mw α, iffw ∉ Φ(α).
Regarding the above definition of truth and the Kripkemodel
of MASL logic, the following theorem can be obtained.
Proposition 4.5. Let M = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ) be a Kripke model.
Then, by the definition of truth, we have:
(i) Mw p → q iff if Mw p, then Mw q;
(ii) Mw ¬p iff 2Mw p;
(iii) Mw p ∧ q iff Mw p and Mw q;
(iv) Mw OBup iff for allw
′ ∈ R(u)(w), we have M
w′ p;
(v) Mw IMup iff for allw
′ ∈ R(u)(w), we have M
w′ ¬p;
(vi) Mw PEup iff there exist w
′ ∈ R(u)(w), such that M
w′ p;
(vii) Mw GRup iff there exist w
′ ∈ R(u)(w), such that M
w′ ¬p.
Proof. It is straight-forward. 
Definition 4.6 (Satisfiability and Validity). A formula, α, is
satisfiable iff there exists a model,M, and a world, w ∈ W in
M, such that Mw α. A formula, α, is valid (denoted by  α) iff for
all models,M, and for all worlds,w ∈ W inM, we have Mw α.
A formula, α, is entailed by a set, Γ , of formulae (denoted by
Γ  α) iff for every model,M, and every world,w ∈ W inM, if
M satisfies Γ atw, then, Mw α.
4.4. Security policy rule
As we mentioned earlier in the description of our proposed
model of an MSD environment, we are about to use MASL to
specify local security policy rules of security domains (denoted
by SPRui for ui’s domain). To this end, we should have the
following assumptions on the alphabet of the MASL for an MSD
environment:
• Σ = {SS,OS, AS, SOS} in which SS is a sort of subjects (or
access requesters), OS is a sort of resources or objects, AS is
a sort of actions, and SOS is a subtype of both SS and OS and
is a sort of active objects that play the role of subjects too.
Note that, J(SS) = S, J(OS) = O, J(AS) = A, and J(SOS) =
S ∩ O where S,O and A are defined in FDS of the proposed
model.
• The set of propositions is equal to the set of contextual
propositions of theMSD environment. This set is denoted by
CX in the formal model.• There exists a ternary predicate do of sort (SS,OS, AS). Note
that do is the main predicate. However, we may have other
predicates, in usingMASL for policy specification, if required.
Following these assumptions, a security policy rule is
defined as follows.
Definition 4.7 (Security Policy Rule). A security policy rule (or in
short policy rule) that is stated by an authority, u, is a formula of
the form:
α → dsu β,
where:
β = do(s, o, a) or β = dsvβ,
where β = do(s, o, a) or β = dsvβ , α is a formula, ds is a
deontic status, u and v are authorities, s of sort SS (or SOS) is a
subject term, o of sortOS (or SOS) is an object term, and a of sort
AS is an action term.
A security policy of the form dsudo(s, o, a) can be defined on
the object term, o, by the authority, u, if objects described by the
term o are registered in the security domain of authority u. In
fact, MASL does not control administrative rights on specifying
security policies andwe should enforce the above control at the
implementation level. Furthermore, as we describe later in this
paper, a security policy of the form dsu(dsvdo(s, o, a)) is valid
whenever authority u has delegative administration rights from
authority v.
There are two categories of policies in the system, autho-
rization policies and obligation policies. The intuitive meaning of
an authorization policy of the form α → dsudo(s, o, a) is that
whenever formula α is satisfied, subject s (a human user, an
agent, or a service) is permitted to, or forbidden to, do action a
on object o. The intuitive meaning of an obligation policy is that
subject s is obliged to, or not to, do action a on object o.
It is important to note thatdo(s, o, a) is an abstract predicate
in which s (which is a subject term) can be an identifier of
a subject, or it can be an attribute, a role or a concept (see
e.g. SBAC model in [39]) that is representative of a number
of subjects. For example, s might be defined as student, which
represents everybody who presents a credential that shows
he/she is a student. For object term o and action term a, we
have analogous interpretations. Hence, byMASL, we can specify
both identity-based and attribute-based (or credential-based)
security policy rules. It is clear that role-based policy rules are
also possible to be specified in MASL.
In specifying the security policy rules using the above
language, wemake the assumption that no authority is allowed
to state inconsistent policy rules. In other words, in the
AddPolicyRule operation for adding a new security policy
rule named pr to SPRui , the following prerequisite should be
satisfied:
KBui ∧ pr 0 ⊥.
Notation⊥ denotes a logical contradiction, and KBui is the local
knowledge base of the corresponding domain. The set of policy
rules specified by authorities and the statements that describe
the current context (i.e. CI ⊆ CX) construct the local knowledge
base in ourmodel. Inference of implicit policy rules specified by
composite authorities is performed on the knowledge base.
5. Calculus of cooperative administration
To enable authorities to enact, manage and enforce secu-
rity policies cooperatively in their cooperative security domain
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tration are introduced in this section: collaborative, disjunctive,
and delegative administration. These three styles of administra-
tion becomepossible through the calculus presented in this sec-
tion as a supplement to our proposed logical language,MASL. To
this end,we first introduce a composite authority, which is a core
concept in this calculus.
A composite authority is a virtual authority that is obtained
by the composition of primitive authorities based on one of
the three aforementioned cooperative administration styles.
Each cooperative domain has a composite authority (instead
of a primitive authority), which is representative of primitive
authorities of the participating domains in the cooperative
administration. The overall syntax of a composite authority is
defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Composite Authority). Given a set of primitive
authorities, &,◃, | notations, and parenthesis as the alphabet,
a composite authority is defined inductively as follows:
• Each primitive authority, like u, is a composite authority.
• If ui and uj are composite authorities, then so are (ui | uj),
(ui ◃ uj), and (ui & uj). (ui & uj) means ui joint with uj,
(ui | uj) means ui disjoint with uj, and (ui ◃ uj) means ui
on behalf of uj.
Adding composite authorities to the proposed security
policy language, i.e. MASL, and promoting it with new axioms
resulting from adding the concept of composite authorities,
enables us to infer security policies specified by composite
authorities on cooperative domains. The automation of policy
derivation for cooperative domains based on the security
policies of participating individual domains, is the main
advantage of such a logic-based cooperative administration
framework. In the rest of this section, for each cooperative
administration, we present the syntax, semantics, axioms and
some useful theorems.
5.1. Disjunctive administration
Two authorities may enter into an agreement for disjunctive
security administration of a shared domain. In disjunctive
administration, the system grants an access if at least one of
the participating authorities authorizes the access; however, it
enforces an obligation or denies an access, if both participating
authorities oblige it. In fact, the disjunctive composition of two
authorities is less strict than the two.
In order to support the disjunctive administration style, a
composite authority (ui | uj) (read ui disjoint with uj) is added
to our calculus. The disjunctive administration style is defined
by the fact that the norms of the disjoint composite authority
(ui|uj) is the union of the participating authorities’ norms. This
is obtained through the union of the worlds relations of the
participating authorities in the semantics.
Axioms and theorems
The only axiom for having disjunctive administration is as
follows:
• ⊢ OB(ui|uj)α ↔ OBuiα ∧ OBujα. (JAD)
Axiom JAD states that whenever two authorities make an
obligation statement disjunctively, it means that both of them
have the same obligation statement separately and they have
agreed upon it.
Regarding the above axiom, the following theorems hold.
JAI, JAC, and JAA show that the disjoint operator (|) is
idempotent, commutative and associative over authorities.• ⊢ OB(ui|ui)α ↔ OBuiα (JAI)• ⊢ OB(ui|uj)α ↔ OB(uj|ui)α (JAC)• ⊢ OB(ui|(uj|uk))α ↔ OB((ui|uj)|uk)α. (JAA)
By definitions of modal statuses and axiom JAD, we get the
following useful theorems:
• ⊢ PE(ui|uj)α ↔ PEuiα ∨ PEujα,• ⊢ IM(ui|uj)α ↔ IMuiα ∧ IMujα,• ⊢ GR(ui|uj)α ↔ GRuiα ∨ GRujα.
The above theorems show that for deriving obligation
policies in disjunctive administration style (by OB or IM
statements), we require to have the consent of both authorities.
However, for deriving authorization policies (by PE or GR
statements), having the word of one authority is enough.
Model
Given security domains SDui = (ui,Oi, SPRui) and SDuj =
(uj,Oj, SPRuj), the disjunctive security domain of SDui and SDuj
is as follows:
SDui|uj = (ui|uj,Oi ∩ Oj, SPRui|uj).
The above relation shows that the domain in which we can
have disjunctive administration is the shared domain obtained
from the domains of the authorities who are participating in
the disjunctive security administration. In this domain (i.e.,
SDui|uj ), SPRui|uj is inferred by the axioms resulted from the
combination of MASL’s core axioms and the aforementioned
axiom and theorems.
Semantics
The extension of the interpretation function R in the pro-
posed Kripke model for disjunctive composition of authorities
is as follows:
R(ui|uj) = R(ui) ∪ R(uj).
The union of relations R(ui) and R(uj) results in the union of the
norms of ui and uj. It is clear that in the bigger set of norms, the
more authorizations and the less obligationswe derive. Figure 2
shows this more precisely.
5.2. Delegative administration
Delegationmeans assigning a part or thewhole of someone’s
privileges to someone else. In information security and
especially in access control, three types of delegation can be
identified:
1. Administration delegation: An authority delegates his/her
administration privileges of making security statements to
other authorities. Hence, the delegated authority can quote
security statements from the delegator authority. As an
example of this kind of delegation see [40].
2. Access delegation: A subject (or access requester) delegates
his/her rights of accessing resources (objects) to other
subjects. In this way, the delegated subject can obtain
access to the resources that are privileged to the delegator
subject. Abadi et al. in [5], introduced this type of delegation
formally, and it has been used in other research like [41].
3. Decision (policy enforcement) delegation: An authorizer or
a system that enforces policies or makes decisions on
accessing subjects to the resources and delegates its
policy enforcement or decision making privilege to another
authorizer. For example, see the delegation of policy
execution in policy-based systems in [42]. Furthermore, this
type of delegation is suitable to be used in privacy control,
which is proposed in [43].
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tion. By the definition of delegation, delegative administration
means inferring and enforcing security policies by an authority
on behalf of another authority. In this way, (ui ◃ uj) denotes
that ui on behalf of uj privileges can enact statements. For ex-
ample, OB(ui◃uj)α means ui states on behalf of uj that α ought to
be the case.
It is worthwhile to note that an authority needs to have
a privilege for specifying statements on behalf of another
authority. Using logic allows us to abstract away from these
implementation details. However, we suppose that trust
infrastructures, like PKI [33], or the delegation network that is
proposed in [40], handles delegation details.
Axioms and theorems
The required axioms for delegative administration are as
follows.
• ⊢ OB(ui◃uj)α ↔ OBui(OBujα) (DAD)• ⊢ OB(ui◃ui)α → OBuiα. (DAI)
AxiomDAD represents that in the delegative administration,
case α is obligatory from the ui ◃ uj point of view, if and only
if, in any state, ui accepts that α is obligatory from uj’s point
of view. Axiom DAI imposes that the delegation operator (◃) is
idempotent. Note that the reverse of DAI also holds, which is
redundant (we refer to it as DAI too).
By the above axioms, we get the following theorem that
shows the delegation operator is associative.
• ⊢ OB(ui◃(uj◃uk))α ↔ OB((ui◃uj)◃uk)α. (DAA)
Regarding the DAD axiom, the following theorems hold for
other statuses than OB:
• ⊢ PE(ui◃uj)α ↔ PEui(PEujα),• ⊢ IM(ui◃uj)α ↔ OBui(IMujα),• ⊢ GR(ui◃uj)α ↔ PEui(GRujα).
The above results reveal that we can infer that case α
is permissible or gratuitous from the viewpoint of ui on
behalf of uj, if the permissible or gratuitous statement of uj is
permissible from ui’s point of view. However, for obligatory or
impermissible cases, we are stricter and require an obligatory
statement of ui over the obligation or impermissible statement
of uj.
Model
Given security domains, SDui = (ui,Oi, SPRui) and SDuj =
(uj,Oj, SPRuj), the delegative security domain of ui on behalf of
uj is as follows:
SDui◃uj = (ui ◃ uj,Ok, SPRui◃uj), Ok ⊆ Oj.Figure 3: Semantics of delegative authority with possibility relation composi-
tion.
The above relation shows that the domain inwhichwe can have
delegative administration is the subdomain of the authority
who delegates.
Semantics
The extension of R to include delegative composition of
authorities is as follows:
R(ui ◃ uj) = R(ui) ◦ R(uj).
The relation composition reflects the fact that from the ui ◃ uj’s
point of view, a worldw′ is (normatively) possible from aworld
w if, and only if,w′ is (normatively) possible fromanotherworld
w′′ in uj’s point of view, and w′′ is (normatively) possible from
w in ui’s point of view (see Figure 3). Hence, OBui◃ujα is true
at world w when α is true at every world possible from w by
the composite relation. Note that the idempotency of delegation
compels the relations R(ui) in the proposed Kripke semantics
to be transitive. As discussed in Section 6.2, the transitive
condition on relations R(u) is problematic and a substitute
approach for having such an axiom should be considered.
5.3. Collaborative administration
Collaborative or joint administration is a stricter approach
in comparison with the disjunctive administration style. In this
style, each authority can make a positive or negative obligation
statement instead of all participating authorities. However, we
cannot easily extend this rule to authorization statements like
permission or gratuitous statements. The rest of this section
clarifies this more precisely by giving the semantics of the
collaborative administration calculus.
A composite authority, (ui&uj) (read it ui joint with uj)
denotes that ui and uj enact collaboratively for their shared
domain.
Axioms and theorems
The required axioms are as follows:
• ⊢ OBuiα ∨ OBujα → OBui&ujα (CAD)
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• ⊢ OBui&ujα → OBuj&uiα (CAC)
• ⊢ OBui&(uj&uk)α ↔ OB(ui&uj)&ukα. (CAA)
In collaborative administration, an obligation statement is
derived when at least one of the participated authorities enacts
the obligation statement. This principle appears as the CAD
axiom in the proposed calculus. Idempotency, commutativity,
and associativity of joint operator (denoted by &) are added by
axioms CAI, CAC, and CAA, respectively. Note that the reverse of
axioms CAI and CAC also holds, which can be derived from the
aforementioned axioms and is, thus, redundant.
By the definitions ofmodal statuses, and theOB-MDandCAD
axioms, we get the following theorems.
• ⊢ PE(ui&uj)α → PEuiα ∧ PEujα,
• ⊢ IMuiα ∨ IMujα → IM(ui&uj)α,
• ⊢ GRui&ujα → GRuiα ∧ GRujα,
• ⊢ OBui&ujα → PEuiα ∧ PEujα,
• ⊢ IMui&ujα → GRuiα ∧ GRujα.
Model
Analogous to the case of disjunctive administration, given
security domains, SDui = (ui,Oi, SPRui) and SDuj = (uj,Oj,
SPRuj), the collaborative security domain of SDui and SDuj is as
follows:
SDui&uj = (ui&uj,Oi ∩ Oj, SPRui&uj).
The above relation shows that similar to the disjunctive
administration style, the domain in which we can have the
collaborative administration style is the shared domain of the
participating security domains. In this domain (i.e., SDui&uj ),
SPRui&uj is inferred by the axioms resulted from the combination
of MASL’s core axioms and the above axioms.
Semantics
The extension of the interpretation function, R, in the Kripke
structure for the joint operator is as follows:
R(ui&uj) = R(ui) ∩ R(uj).
Intersection of R(ui) and R(uj) results in the intersection of the
norms of ui and uj. This results in stricter administration, in
comparison with each one of the participating authorities.
5.4. Hybrid administration
Wemay require the application of different combinations of
the three aforementioned administration styles in security ad-
ministration of cooperative domains. To this end, complicated
compositions of authorities should be supported by the pro-
posed logic. The following axioms, accompanied by the core ax-
ioms of MASL and the axioms of collaborative, disjunctive and
delegative administration styles, enable the MASL logical sys-
tem to infer complicated composite authorities’ security policy
rules for this purpose.
Axioms and theorems
The essential axioms for having hybrid administration are as
follows.
• ⊢ OB(ui&(uj|uk))α ↔ OB(ui&uj)|(ui&uk)α (DCJ)
• ⊢ OBui◃(uj&uk)α → OB(ui◃uj)&(ui◃uk)α. (DDC)Axiom DCJ shows the left-distribution of the collaboration
operator (&) over the disjunction operator (|). Axiom DDC
shows the left-distribution of the delegation operator (◃) over
the collaboration operator (&); however, the reverse does not
hold. Similar formulae for right-distribution also hold, which
are derivable.
The distribution of disjunction operator (|) over collabora-
tion operator (&) from left and right, and distribution of the del-
egation operator (◃) over the disjunction operator (|) also hold
as the following theorems:
• ⊢ OBui|(uj&uk)α ↔ OB(ui|uj)&(ui|uk)α (DJC)
• ⊢ OBui◃(uj|uk)α ↔ OB(ui◃uj)|(ui◃uk)α. (DDJ)
Proof. DDJ can be obtained easily from axioms DAD and JAD.
DJC is proven to hold as follows.
[If Part] By distributing & over | using axiomDCJ in two steps




↔ OBuiα ∧ OB(uj&uk)α ∧ OB(ui&uj)α ∧ OB(ui&uk)α.
Thus, we have:
⊢ OB(ui|uj)&(ui|uk)α
↔ OBuiα ∧ OB(uj&uk) ∧ OB(ui&uj)α ∧ OB(ui&uk)α. (1)
Considering this theorem and axiom ⊢ A∧ B → A, by applying
MP, we get ⊢ OB(ui|uj)&(ui|uk)α → OBuiα ∧ OB(uj&uk)α, and thus,
OB(ui|uj)&(ui|uk)α → OBui|(uj&uk)α.
[Only If Part] By axiom CAD, we can prove:
⊢ OBuiα → OB(ui&uj)α, (2)
⊢ OBuiα → OB(ui&uk)α. (3)
Also by axiom JAD, we get:
⊢ OBui|(uj&uk)α → OBuiα ∧ OB(uj&uk)α. (4)
By tautology ⊢ A ∧ B → A and Theorems (2)–(4) in the above,
we get:
⊢ OBui|(uj&uk)α → OB(ui&uj)α, (5)
⊢ OBui|(uj&uk)α → OB(ui&uk)α. (6)
Considering the inference rule A→B,A→CA→B∧C (which is easily
provable by tautologies and rule MP) and Theorems (4)–(6), we
conclude that:
⊢ OBui|(uj&uk)α
→ OBuiα ∧ OB(uj&uk)α ∧ OB(ui&uj)α ∧ OB(ui&uk)α.
By Theorem (1), it is clear that:
⊢ OB(ui|uj)&(ui|uk)α → OBui|(uj&uk)α. 
Note that the collaboration (&) and disjunction (|) operators are
not distributive over the delegation operator (◃); however, we
have the following theorem, which is easily proven using DAD
and JAD axioms.
⊢ OBui|(uj◃uk)α ← OB(ui|uj)◃(ui|uk)α.
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Studying the behavior of authorities shows that authorities
can form a hierarchy based on their strictness level. There
exists a strictness relation between two authorities, ui and uj,
denoted by ui ≼ uj if, and only if, authority uj is stricter
than ui. Intuitively, this means that every case that ui enacts
as obligatory, uj enacts as well. Furthermore, the equivalence
relation is defined between two authorities (denoted by ui ≈
uj) when they have the same strictness level.
Formally, we define the strictness relation and equivalence
relation as follows:
• ⊢ ui ≼ uj if and only if ⊢ (OBuiα → OBujα) (STD)• ⊢ ui ≈ uj if and only if ⊢ (OBuiα ↔ OBujα). (EQD)
In other words, ui ≈ uj if, and only if, ui ≼ uj and uj ≼ ui.
Using the Kripke structure, more strictness of uj in compar-
ison with ui means that the set of norms of uj is a subset of
norms of ui. On this basis, the interpretation of strictness re-
lation ui ≼ uj is defined as follows.
Φ(ui ≼ uj) =

W , if R(uj) ⊆ R(ui)
∅, otherwise.
Following the above definition of strictness relation, the
following theorems hold:
• ⊢ (ui|uj) ≼ ui and ⊢ (ui|uj) ≼ uj,• ⊢ ui ≼ (ui&uj) and ⊢ uj ≼ (ui&uj).
These relations mean that the authority obtained by
collaborative composition of ui and uj (i.e., ui&uj) is stricter than
each of authorities, ui and uj. However, both ui and uj are stricter
than their disjunctive composition (i.e., ui|uj).
The above mentioned discussion concludes that the collab-
orative composition of two authorities, ui and uj (i.e., ui&uj)
and their disjunctive composition (i.e., ui|uj) are the least up-
per bound (or supremum) and the greatest lower bound (or in-
fimum) of ui and uj with respect to the strictness relation (≼).
On this basis, it is clear that (⟨AU,≼⟩,&, |) or the set of author-
ities with strictness relation and two operations & and |, forms
a lattice.
In this lattice, if we have a strictness relation between two
authorities (e.g., ui ≼ uj), the following relations are easily
concluded.




6. Properties of MASL
The essential properties of the MASL logical language,
including the soundness and completeness of the logic, are
discussed in this section.
6.1. Soundness
With respect to the above semantics, we can prove that the
presented axiomatic system is sound, i.e., if ⊢ α, then  α. The
soundness proof can be obtained by proving that the axioms are
sound and the inference rules preserve soundness, i.e. theymap
valid premises to valid conclusions.
The soundness of the OB-MK and OB-MD axioms are given
in Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 as follows.
Proposition 6.1 (Soundness of AxiomOB-MK). The OB-MK axiom
is sound.Proof. Suppose for some model M = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ) and
some w ∈ W , we have Mw OBu(p → q), or in other words
w ∈ Φ(OBu(p → q)); this means that formula p → q is
satisfied by all worlds reachable from world w from u’s point
of view, i.e. M
w′ p → q for allw′ ∈ R(u)(w).
Assume we have Mw OBup, which implies, in a similar way,
M
w′ p for allw
′ ∈ R(u)(w).
From the two above results,we get in allw′ ∈ R(u)(w),M
w′ p.
By clause (i) of Proposition 4.5, we conclude that M
w′ q for all
w′ ∈ R(u)(w), which results in Mw OBuq. Thus, Mw OBu(p →
q)→ (OBup → OBuq) holds. 
Proposition 6.2 (Soundness of AxiomOB-MD). TheOB-MDaxiom
is sound.
Proof. Suppose for some model M = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ) and
some w ∈ W , we have Mw OBup and, in other words, w ∈
Φ(OBup). Since relation R(u) is serial, there exists a worldw′ ∈
R(u)(w), and by the assumption, we get Mw p. Thus there exists
a world w′ ∈ R(u)(w), such that 2M
w′ ¬p, and, thus 2Mw OBu¬p,
or, in other words, Mw ¬OBu¬p. By assumption Mw OBup, we
obtained Mw ¬OBu¬p. Hence, by clause (i) of Proposition 4.5, we
conclude that Mw OBup → ¬OBu¬p. 
The soundness proof of axioms JAD, DAD, CAD, DDC are
presented in the following propositions. The soundness proofs
of the other axioms of composite authorities are proved
similarly.
Proposition 6.3 (Soundness of Axiom JAD). Axiom JAD is sound.
Proof. Suppose for some model M = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ) and
some w ∈ W , we have Mw OBui|ujα. Thus, w ∈ Φ(OBui|ujα) if,
and only if,w ∈ Φ(OBuiα ∧ OBujα), because:
Φ(OBui|ujα) = {w|R(ui|uj)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|(R(ui) ∪ R(uj))(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|R(ui)(w) ∪ R(uj)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|R(ui)(w) ⊆ Φ(α) ∧ R(uj)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|R(ui)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)} ∩ {w|R(uj)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= Φ(OBuiα) ∩ Φ(OBujα)
= Φ(OBuiα ∧ OBujα).
Hence, Mw OBui|ujα ↔ OBuiα ∧ OBujα. 
Proposition 6.4 (Soundness of Axiom DAD). Axiom DAD is sound.
Proof. Suppose for some model M = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ) and
some w ∈ W , we have Mw OBui◃ujα. Thus, w ∈ Φ(OBui◃ujα), if
and only ifw ∈ Φ(OBui(OBujα)), because:
Φ(OBui◃ujα) = {w|R(ui ◃ uj)(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|(R(ui) ◦ R(uj))(w) ⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|∀w′, if (w,w′) ∈ R(ui) then, R(uj)(w′)
⊆ Φ(α)}
= {w|R(ui)(w) ⊆ {w′|R(uj)(w′) ⊆ Φ(α)}}
= {w|R(ui)(w) ⊆ Φ(OBujα)}
= Φ(OBui(OBujα)).
Hence, Mw OBui◃ujα ↔ OBui(OBujα). 
Proposition 6.5 (Soundness of Axiom CAD). Axiom CAD is sound.
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somew ∈ W , we have Mw OBuiα ∨ OBujα.
Then:
w ∈ Φ(OBuiα ∨ OBujα)
iff w ∈ Φ(OBuiα) ∪ Φ(OBujα)
iff w ∈ {w|∀w′, (w,w′) ∈ R(ui)→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)}
∪{w|∀w′, (w, a′) ∈ R(uj)→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)}
then :
w ∈ {w|∀w′, (w,w′) ∈ R(ui) ∩ R(uj)→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)}
∪{w|∀w′, (w, a′) ∈ R(uj) ∩ R(ui)→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)}
iff w ∈ {w|(w,w′) ∈ R(ui&uj)→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)}
iff w ∈ Φ(OBui&ujα).
Thus, Mw OBui&ujα. Hence, the axiom is sound. 
Proposition 6.6 (Soundness of Axiom DDC). The DDC axiom is
sound.
Proof. Suppose for some model M = (W , R,∆, J, I,Φ) and
somew ∈ W , we have Mw OBui◃(uj&uk)α. Then:
w ∈ Φ(OBui◃(uj&uk))
iff ∀w′, [(w,w′) ∈ R(ui) ◦ R(uj&uk)] → w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff ∀w′, [(w,w′) ∈ R(ui) ◦ (R(uj) ∩ R(uk))]
→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff ∀w′, [∃w′′, (w,w′′) ∈ R(ui) ∧ ((w′′, w′) ∈ R(uj)
∧ (w′′, w′) ∈ R(uk))] → w′ ∈ Φ(α).
Considering the fact that ∃x ·(p(x)∧q(x))→ ∃x ·p(x)∧∃x ·q(x),
by the above, we get:
∀w′, [(∃w′′, (w,w′′) ∈ R(ui) ∧ (w′′, w′) ∈ R(uj))
∧ (∃w′′, (w,w′′) ∈ R(ui) ∧ (w′′, w′) ∈ R(uk))]
→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff ∀w′, [(w,w′) ∈ R(ui) ◦ R(uj) ∧ (w,w′)
∈ R(ui) ◦ R(uk)] → w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff ∀w′, [(w,w′) ∈ R(ui ◃ uj) ∧ (w,w′)
∈ R(ui ◃ uk)] → w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff ∀w′, (w,w′) ∈ R(ui ◃ uj) ∩ R(ui ◃ uk)→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff ∀w′, (w,w′) ∈ R((ui ◃ uj) & (ui ◃ uk))→ w′ ∈ Φ(α)
iff w ∈ Φ(OB(ui◃uj)&(uj◃uk)α).
Thus, we have Mw OB(ui◃uj)&(uj◃uk)α. By clause (i) of Proposi-
tion 4.5, we conclude that axiom DDC holds, and is hence
sound. 
Theorem 6.7 (Soundness ofMASL). MASL logic is sound, such that
if ⊢ A, then  A.
Proof. To prove the soundness of a logical system, we just need
to show that its axioms and inference rules are sound. Then, we
can verify by induction on the length of proof, that if ⊢ A, then
 A. Propositions 6.1–6.6 prove the soundness of OB-MK, OB-
MD, JAD, DAD, CAD, and DDC axioms. The soundness proofs of
other axioms and inference rules are nomore complicated. 
6.2. Condition on worlds relations
In order to validate axiom DAI (i.e., OB(ui◃ui)α → OBuiα),
relations R(ui) are required to be transitive. Transitivity means:
∀w,w′, w′′, (w,w′) ∈ R(ui) ∧ (w′, w′′) ∈ R(ui)
→ (w,w′′) ∈ R(ui).Table 1: Preserving the properties of worlds relation in the composition of
authorities.
Property R(u1 | u2) R(u1 & u2) R(u1 ◃ u2)
Transitivity × ✓ ×
Seriality ✓ × ✓
Reflexivity ✓ ✓ ✓
The problem existing for transitivity is that if we suppose that
R for primitive authorities is transitive, the composition of
authorities does not preserve the transitivity. Table 1 shows
where we lose this property in the composition of authorities.
To solve the problem, considering the fact that the idempo-
tency of the delegation operator for composite authorities is not
required in practice, we eliminate the DAI axiom from the pro-
posedproof theory and instead add the equivalences of the form
(ui ◃ ui) ≈ ui for all primitive authorities ui (i.e., ui ∈ PAU) to
the knowledge base of the model.
The relations R(ui) need to be serial to validate the OB-
MD axiom. As shown in Table 1, seriality is not preserved
by collaborative composition of authorities. For solving the
problem,we require to have a stricter condition to be preserved
in all cases. For this purpose, we take the reflexivity condition
for the relations R(ui). It is easy to prove that this condition is
preserved in all kinds of authority composition (see Table 1).
Although reflexivity tackles the problem of validating axiom
OB-MD, it creates a new problem that the obtained semantics
makes the proof theory incomplete. By the obtained semantics,
the formula OBuiα → α for arbitrary authority ui and arbitrary
formula α (known as axiom T in modal logics) is satisfiable;
however, it is not derivable by the proposed proof theory. In
fact, we do not like to have such an axiom in our logic, because
this axiom bans the authorities of a shared domain from having
contradictory policy rules for an access. For example, if we
have OBu1do(s, o, a) and also IMu2do(s, o, a), by this axiom we
get do(s, o, a) and ¬do(s, o, a), which are contradictory. Thus,
the set {OBu1do(s, o, a), IMu2do(s, o, a)} becomes inconsistent,
which is not desired in our approach.
6.3. Completeness
The discussion on the required conditions for the R(ui)
relations in the previous section shows that preserving some
properties imposes some problems in completeness of the
proposed proof theory. It is shown that the collaboration
operator does not preserve the seriality, and substituting the
seriality with reflexivity (which implies seriality as well) makes
the proposed logic incomplete.
Furthermore, the existence of a collaboration operator
(interpreted as the intersection of world’s relations) results
in some problems having a complete proof theory regarding
Kripke-style semantics. A similar problem in ProgramsDynamic
Logic (PDL) with intersection was open for several years [44].
Note that there are many differences between dynamic logic
and MASL that deters use of the proposed approach for having
a complete proof theory for dynamic logic with intersection in
MASL. Some of the main reasons are due to the requirement of
having the OB-MD and DAI axioms in MASL and philosophical
differences between the notion of possible worlds and the
accessibility relations in Kripke-style models of the two logics.
By the above discussion, we can conclude that we cannot
have a complete proof theory that satisfies our logical require-
ments, except that we waive the collaboration composition
from MASL. By such a modification in MASL (call it MASL&− ),
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and the proposed proof theory.
Furthermore, we can prove the decidability ofMASL&− using
a model theoretic approach (which is more popular than that
of the proof theoretic) and also leverage the analytical tableaux
method for automated reasoning in real applications.
Now, we prove the completeness of MASL&− . Using the
techniques mentioned for maximal consistent sets in [45], we
can easily prove that for each consistent set, Γ , of formulae,
there exists a maximal consistent set, denoted by Γ ∗, with
Γ ⊆ Γ ∗. A maximal consistent set Γ ∗ is closed under inference
and for each formula α, either α ∈ Γ ∗ or ¬α ∈ Γ ∗. Also, the
following lemma is easily proved in our logic.
Lemma 6.8. Let u be an authority, α be a formula, and Ψ be a
maximal consistent set such that ¬OBuα ∈ Ψ . ThenΨ↓uα which is
defined as follows, is a consistent set:
Ψ↓uα = {β|OBuβ ∈ Ψ } ∪ {¬α}.
Definition 6.9 (Canonical Model). The canonical model gener-
ated by a consistent set Γ is the structure CM = (WC, RC,
∆C, JC, IC,ΦC)where:
(i) WC (as a set of worlds) is defined as the smallest collection
of maximal consistent sets, such that:
• Γ ∗ is inWC ,
• If w is in WC and α is a formula with ¬OBuα ∈ w, then
(w↓uα)∗ is inWC .
(ii) RC is the mapping function from authorities to a set
of binary relations on WC , such that for all primitive
authorities u ∈ PAU and allwi, wj ∈ WC , (wi, wj) ∈ RC(u),
iff for all formulae α, whenever OBuα ∈ wi, then α ∈ wj.
(iii) ∆C is the non-empty set of objects, in which for every term
ti appeared in the language of Γ , there is a unique object,
ai.
(iv) JC is the mapping function, such that for every type, σ is
defined as JC(σ ) =ti:σ {ai}.
(v) IC is the interpretation function, such that at each world,
w ∈ WC is defined as follows:
• For each term ti in the language of Γ , we assign a set just
containing the object ai ∈ ∆C , i.e., [ti]ICw = {ai}.• For each n-ary predicate symbol, p, in the language of Γ ,







(vi) ΦC is the mapping function that maps each formula to a
subset ofWC , and is defined as follows:
• For propositions, it is defined by φC as follows. For each
proposition x (appeared in the language of Γ ) and each
w ∈ WC ,w ∈ φC(x) iff x ∈ w.
• For T and F, it is defined asΦC(T) = WC andΦC(F) = ∅.
• Forn-ary predicates on terms t1, . . . , tn, i.e.,p(t1, . . . , tn),
it is defined as follows:








• For non-atomic formulae, it is defined inductively
similar to functionΦ in Section 4.3.
It is easy to show that the defined canonicalmodel is a Kripke
model ofMASL&− ; e.g. RC is serial and IC satisfies the conditions
presented for I in Section 4.3.Lemma 6.10. For allw ∈ WC in canonical modelCM, all author-
ities, u ∈ AU, and all formulae, α, we have:
(i) OBuα ∈ w iff for all w′ ∈ WC , if (w,w′) ∈ RC(u), then
α ∈ w′,
(ii) PEuα ∈ w iff there existsw′ ∈ WC such that (w,w′) ∈ RC(u)
and α ∈ w′.
Proof. They are proved as follows:
(i) [Only If Part] We prove it inductively as follows:
Basis (u ∈ PAU): it is immediately obtained by the
definition of RC for primitive authorities.
Inductive step (u ∈ CAU): suppose the lemma holds for
composite authorities u1 and u2.
– Case u = u1 | u2: since w as a maximal consistent set
is closed under inference, if OBu1|u2α ∈ w, then OBu1α,
OBu2α ∈ w. Due to the fact that the lemma holds for u1
and u2 (and p → r ∧ q → r ≡ p ∨ q → r), we get:∀w′ ∈ WC,
(w,w′) ∈ RC(u1) ∨ (w,w′) ∈ RC(u2)→ α ∈ w′.
Since RC(u1 | u2) = RC(u1) ∪ RC(u2), the lemma holds
for authority u = u1 | u2.
– Case u = u1 ◃ u2: since w is closed under inference, if
OBu1◃u2α ∈ w, then by axiom DAD OBu1(OBu2α) ∈ w. By
the induction hypothesis,
∀w′ ∈ WC, (w,w′) ∈ RC(u1)→ OBu2α ∈ w′,
and also because OBu2α ∈ w′, we have:
∀w′′ ∈ WC, (w′, w′′) ∈ RC(u2)→ α ∈ w′′.
Thus:
∀w′ ∈ WC, (w,w′) ∈ RC(u1)
→ (∀w′′ ∈ WC, ((w′, w′′) ∈ RC(u2)
→ α ∈ w′′))
iff ∀w′′, ∃w′, (w,w′) ∈ RC(u1)→ ((w′, w′′)
∈ RC(u2)→ α ∈ w′′)
iff ∀w′′, ∃w′, (w,w′) ∈ RC(u1) ∧ (w′, w′′)
∈ RC(u2)→ α ∈ w′′
iff ∀w′′, (w,w′′) ∈ RC(u1) ◦ RC(u2)→ α ∈ w′′
iff ∀w′′, (w,w′′) ∈ RC(u1 ◃ u2)→ α ∈ w′′.
[If Part] We suppose that OBuα ∉ w. Thus, ¬OBuα ∈ w,
and by the definition of w↓uα , ¬α ∈ w↓uα , and since
w↓uα ⊆ (w↓uα)∗, thus ¬α ∈ (w↓uα)∗ and α ∉ (w↓uα)∗.
Also, by the definition of WC , (w↓uα)∗ ∈ WC and by the
definition of w↓uα , for all formulae β , if OBuβ ∈ w, then
β ∈ (w↓uα)∗. Thus, by the definition of RC , (w, (w↓uα)∗) ∈
RC(u). Hence, there exists a world w′ = (w↓uα)∗ ∈ WC
such that (w,w′) ∈ RC(u) and α ∉ w′, which contradicts
the hypothesis.
(ii) It is straight-forward using the result of proof of (i). 
Lemma 6.11. For all w ∈ WC in canonical model CM, we haven
i=1[ti]ICw ⊆ [p]ICw iff p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ w.
Proof (If Part). It is straight-forward.
[Only If Part] Suppose we have
n




Since in the definition of IC , every term has a unique object
in its interpretation, we get (a1, . . . , an) ∈ ni=1[ti]ICw . Thus,
there must exist p(tj1, . . . , tjn) ∈ w, such that (a1, . . . , an) ∈n
i=1[tji]ICw , and so we have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ [tji]ICw . Due to
the fact that ai is the unique object of ti, we conclude that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, tji = ti. Since p(tj1, . . . , tjn) ∈ w, we conclude that
p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ w. 
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maximal consistent set, w ∈ WC , in a canonical model, CM,
CMw α iff α ∈ w.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the length of α.
Basis: if α is an atomic formula
• α is verum. Then, CMw T iff due to the fact that w as a
maximal consistent set is closed under inference, by axiom
TAUT, we have T ∈ w. Correspondingly, we have not CMw F
iff F ∉ w.
• α is a proposition xi. Then, CMw xi iff by the definition of
truth,w ∈ ΦC(xi) iff by the definition ofΦC for propositions,
xi ∈ w, i.e. α ∈ w.• α is a predicate p(t1, . . . , tn). Then, CMw p(t1, . . . , tn) iff by
the definition of truth, w ∈ ΦC(p(t1, . . . , tn)) iff by the
definition of ΦC ,
n
i=1[ti]ICw ⊆ [p]ICw , iff by Lemma 6.11,
p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ w, i.e. α ∈ w.
Induction step: Suppose that the lemma holds for β , i.e. CMw iff
β ∈ w.
• By Proposition 4.5, and the properties of maximal consistent
sets, the proof of the inductive cases for ¬α, αi ∧ αj and
αi → αj can be shown easily.• For case α = OBuβ , we have CMw OBuβ .
iff by Proposition 4.5, for allw′ ∈ RC(u)(w), CMw′ β
iff by the induction hypothesis, for all w′ ∈ RC(u)(w), β ∈
w′, iff by clause (i) of Lemma 6.10, we have OBuβ ∈ w.• For cases α = PEuβ , IMuβ , and GRuβ , we can easily prove by
the result of the inductive cases for OBuβ , ∧, and ¬. 
Lemma 6.13 (Model Existence). Let Γ be a set of formulae in
MASL&− . If Γ is consistent, then Γ is satisfiable.
Proof. Assume Γ be any consistent set of formulae in MASL&−
andCM be a canonicalmodel generated byΓ . Hence,Γ ∗ ∈ WC
by the definition of WC . By the coincidence lemma, we have
CMΓ ∗ α iff α ∈ Γ ∗. Since Γ ⊆ Γ ∗, we have CMΓ ∗ α for every
formula α in Γ . Thus, for consistent set Γ , we constructed a
model, i.e.CM, such that for a world, i.e. Γ ∗, we have CMΓ ∗ α for
every α in Γ . Hence, Γ is satisfiable. 
Theorem 6.14 (Strong Completeness). MASL&− is strongly com-
plete, i.e. if Γ  α, then Γ ⊢ α.
Proof. Since model existence lemma holds, we conclude that
strong completeness holds as well; if Γ  α, then Γ ⊢ α. 7. Security policy enforcement
In each security domain, the Security Agent (SA) is
responsible for enforcing security policies that are specified
by the domain’s authority. For cooperative security domains,
the specified policy rules are inferred through the policy
rules specified by each of the participating authorities in the
cooperative administration. Following the proposed framework
for MSD environments, we present our proposed architecture
for an SA for enforcing security policy rules in the rest of this
section.
7.1. Architecture of a security agent
There are some standard frameworks that are established
for security policy enforcement and especially access control,
such as the ITU-T international standard for access control
framework [32] and the OASIS standard for the eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) framework [31]. For
implementing a Security Agent (SA) in a Security Domain (SD),
we suggest the architecture that is illustrated in Figure 4. In
proposing this architecture, its compatibility with the existing
standard security frameworks, i.e. ITU-T [32] and OASIS-
XACML [31] standard frameworks has been considered.
This architecture contains a number of external entities and
a number of internal components as follows.
External entities
The important external components and entities that
communicate with an SA are as follows:
• Subject (User): An actor (e.g., human user, agent, system
entity or service) that attempts to access the domain’s re-
sources. It needs to submit an access request and the re-
quired relevant credentials (attribute certificates) to the SA.
• Environment: This is the resource of environmental contex-
tual information that is independent of a particular subject,
object or action (such as time) and is required for access de-
cisions and obligation enforcement.
• Authority: The domain’s authority, which states the Security
Policy Rules (SPR) of the domain using the Policy Adminis-
tration Point (PAP).
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a trust infrastructure, like PMI [33] or SPKI/SDSI [35]) that
verifies the validity of credentials (attribute certificates) pro-
vided by a subject.
Internal components
The internal components of an SA are as follows:
• Policy Administration Point (PAP): The component that pro-
vides an interface for the domain’s authority to state security
policy rules, negotiates with other authorities to determine
the cooperative administration style applicable for cooper-
ative domains, and configure the meta policy. Note that an
SA requires security policy rules for participating domains
to infer its composite authority’s stated policy rules. This
is made possible by the communication between PAP com-
ponents of participating domains with the PAP component
of the SD through the inter-domain communication chan-
nel that is described in the specification of MSD cooperation
framework in Section 3.1. Communicationwith other PAPs is
done by getting a request from each PDP component, when-
ever it is required. The fetched policy rules from other do-
mains are gathered in the SPR Base of the SA.
• Policy Decision Point (PDP): The component that infers
applicable security policy rules, including authorizations as
well as obligations (using the inference engine), and decides
about a requested access and the obligation rules related to
the access request. The axiomatic systems described in the
previous sections are used to infer the implicit policy rules
from the explicit ones.
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): The system component that
receives a subject’s request, performs access control and
enforces applicable obligations determined by the PDP
component. This component employs the following two
subsystems:
– Access Control Enforcement Subsystem (ACS): The subsys-
tem that works as a proxy of resources registered in the
domain. It controls all the access requests delivered from
subjects (users) in an MSD environment. More details on
the access control decision making process (which is per-
formed by PDP) are described in Section 7.2.
– Obligation Enforcement Service (OES): The services in the
system for enforcing and executing the obligations that
are decided for the system or subjects. It maintains a
list of live obligations which are required to be done
in a given situation or before a requested access. The
Context Handler informs the obligation services about
the required situations or events. In Section 7.3, more
challenges to obligation enforcement are discussed.
• Context handler: The system component that gathers
required context information and evaluates contextual
propositions. In our proposed architecture, the position of
the Context Handler component is changed in comparison
with the XACML framework [31] in order to increase its per-
formance. In fact, in our architecture, the Context Handler
just gathers and evaluates the context information deter-
mined by the PDP component based on the components of
the access request (i.e., subject, object, and action) and ver-
ified subject’s (or user’s) attributes. It also triggers OES for
satisfaction of events that are set for obligation enforcement.
• Knowledge Base (KB): The union of Security Policy Rules
(SPR), Meta Security Policy rules (MSP), and current context
information (CI ⊆ CX) form the Knowledge Base (KB) in this
architecture. The inference engine in the PDP component
does inferences over this knowledge base. Security policyrules of the domain and other domains (which are required
for enforcing cooperative administration), andmeta policies,
are delivered from the PAP component. Current context
information, as a set of context propositions, is fulfilled by
the Context Handler component.
• Credential verifier: The duty of this system entity is to
check the validity of the credentials provided by subjects in
accessing the domain’s resources or objects. It has to query
the Source Of Authority (SOA) for this purpose.
7.2. Access control
The central security mechanism in each system is an access
control subsystem. When receiving an access request in such
a system, we need to make a decision whether to permit the
requested access or not.
Access control in individual domains is easily done based
on the security policy rules specified by their authorities.
However, for cooperative domains, administration or the
policy enforcement strategy might be different based on the
agreement made between the rightful authorities. In previous
sections, cooperative administration is modeled by the concept
of composite authority. Hence, for access control, we just
need to infer implicit policy rules composed by composite
authorities in the cooperative domains. The way in which a
composite authority is determined (specified) depends on the
cooperative administration strategy that we intend to have for
that cooperative domain. For example, if authority ui makes an
agreementwith uj to have a disjunctive administration strategy
in their shared domain, we must infer implicit policy rules
composed by the disjunctive authority, ui|uj.
Based on the above description, and the logic-based model
that was presented, the access decisionmaking functions are as
follows. In these functions, we have the arguments u ∈ AU , s of
sort SS, o of sort OS, and a of sort AS.
Basic Access Decision Function
BADF(u, s, o, a) =
Deny, if KB ⊢ IMudo(s, o, a)
Grant, if KB ⊢ PEudo(s, o, a)
Don’t care, otherwise.
Final Access Decision Function
FADF(u, s, o, a)
=

Deny, if [BADF(u, s, o, a) = Deny]
or [BADF(u, s, o, a) = Don’t care ∧ DefSt = IM]
Grant, otherwise.
The BADF function goes through the existing policy rules for
permissible or impermissible ones, and the FADF function
makes the final decision. In the definition of FADF, DefSt returns
to the default access right that might be set to one of IM, PE,
or GR deontic statuses. Thus, if there is no policy rule for a
request, the default strategy determines the final decision for
the requested access. DefSt is stored in the MSP data store in
the SA architecture (see Figure 4). Note that the above functions
are used for access decision making in the PDP component in
the proposed architecture for SA. The resulting decisions are
enforced by the PEP component.
7.3. Obligation enforcement
The issues related to the inference of obligation policies are
similar to those related to the inference of those of authoriza-
tion ones. We follow the same approach for having cooperative
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ment of obligations is different fromauthorization, and requires
its own enforcement mechanisms and services, apart from ac-
cess control services.
We can classify obligations into two classes: the obliga-
tions related to accesses requested by subjects (also called pro-
visions [46]), and obligations that are independent of access
request events. Obligations belonging to the first class can be
inferred and enforced whenever an access request is delivered.
However, obligations of the second class should be monitored
periodically by the system through checking their contextual
conditions and deriving the live obligations (the obligations
their conditions are satisfied by in the current context) and then
they should be enforced. Both classes of obligations are consid-
ered in the proposed architecture. The OES component in the
architecture can check the contextual condition of collected
obligations (delivered through PDP) by communicating with
the Context Handler.
Monitoring and enforcing obligations (or its restricted
type, provisions) are one of the open problems in security
administration. Since we concentrated on the specification
and inference of security policies, including obligation policies
in this paper, we do not scrutinize the details of obligation
enforcement in this paper. Some approaches for monitoring
and enforcement of obligations and provisions are addressed
in [47–50].
7.4. A brief discussion on conflicts
One of the important issues in policy specification and
enforcement with different authorities is the conflicts between
the policy rules. With the short discussion in this section, we
show that we do not have any problem regarding this issue in
our proposed approach.
There are two types of conflict that we can consider in this
model:
• Conflicts occur between the policy rules of an authority:
These kinds of conflict might occur in adding conflicting
policy rules to the knowledge-base of the domain using
AddPolicyRule operation. But this is impossible, because
adding such conflicting rules makes SPR in the knowledge-
base inconsistent, which is forbidden, as mentioned at the
end of Section 4.4 (describing the prerequisite of adding new
policy rules using AddPolicyRule operation).
• Conflicts occur between the policy rules defined by different
authorities on a shared resource: these kinds of conflict do
not make any problem in our proposed approach. In fact,
one of the main goals of the proposed approach is handling
such conditions. Note that conflicting policy rules defined
by different authorities do not make the knowledge-base
inconsistent, because e.g. we have IMuido and PEujdo, where
indexes ui and uj are different. The cooperativemanagement
style, which you choose for the shared domain (by defining
a composite authority) determines your conflict resolution
strategy, in practice. Everything inferred for the composite
authority from the defined policy rules is applicable to the
shared resources. For example, by choosing a disjunctive
administration style (ui|uj), we can infer PEui|ujdo; however,
by choosing a collaborative administration style (ui&uj), we
can infer IMui&ujdo, in this example.
Following the above discussion, we do not need to worry
about conflicts in the proposed approach.8. Application example
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed logical
model and cooperative administration styles, we present a
small case study based on the collaborative region concept,
which is introduced in the MIT Oxygen project [51].
Collaborative meeting region
In the Oxygen project, a collaborative meeting region is
defined as an areawith a set of devices formeetings. This region
has a set of trust and authorization rules that specify what
happens during a meeting [51]. For the security administration
of the collaborative region in Oxygen, we suggest applying
our proposed model. For this purpose, we define the following
scenario.
In a collaborative meeting room, all meeting members (who
are participating in a meeting) are authorities of the meeting
room (with all resources that are available there). Eachmeeting
member has his/her own security rules (obligation as well as
authorization rules). In our case, Bob and Alice are meeting
members with the following security policy rules. We suppose
that themeeting room has a security agent that we call MSA for
short.MSA is another authority of the room.Wewill see the role
of MSA in this case later.
Alice’s security policy rules
Alice likes to delegate the administration to the meeting
room’s security agent (MSA) by transferring her security policy
rules to it. She does not allow the printing of confidential
documents (in her domain) in any case. She allows meeting
members to read the confidential documents when they are
in the meeting room for a meeting. She also gives a meeting
member read-only permission on customers’ informationwhen
the location of themeeting is outside their company. The logical
representation of Alice’s security policy rules are as follows.
Note that in the following policy rules, each statement placed
in the parentheses in the left side of a rule is a proposition.
[AP1]: (Alice’s location is meeting room) ∧ (time is meeting
time) → OBAlice do(AliceSecAgent, MeetSecPolicies,
transferTo(MSA))
[AP2]: True→ IMAlice do(Any, ConfDocs, print)
[AP3]: (requester’s location is meeting room) ∧ (time is
meeting time) → PEAlice do(MeetMember, ConfDocs,
read)
[AP4]: ¬ (requester’s location is company) ∧ (location is
meeting room) → PEAlice do(MeetMember, CustInfo,
read).
Bob’s security rules
Bob, similarly to Alice, likes to delegate the administration
to theMeeting room’s Security Agent (MSA). He allowsmeeting
members to print any documents when they are in themeeting
room. However, he does not allow anybody who is outside the
company to write or update customer information.
[BP1]: (Bob’s location is meeting room) ∧ (time is meeting
time) → OBAlice do (BobSecAgent, MeetSecPolicies,
transferTo(MSA))
[BP2]: (requester’s location is meeting room) → PEBob
do(MeetMember, Docs, print)
[BP3]: True→ PEBob do(MeetMember, CustInfo, read)
[BP4]: ¬ (requester’s location is company) → IMBob do(Any,
CustInfo, write).
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their first obligation policy, their agent (which is installed on
their PDAs) must send all the security policies to the Meeting
Security Agent (MSA). MSA establishes its security policies
based on the received security policies as follows. In this way,
MSA obligates every obligation policy specified by Alice or Bob
and makes permissible every authorization policy specified by
them.
[MP1]: True→ OBMSA(IMAlice do(Any, ConfDocs, print))
[MP2]: (requester’s location is meeting room)∧ (time is meet-
ing time)→ PEMSA(PEAlice do(MeetMember, ConfDocs,
read))
[MP3]: ¬ (requester’s location is company)∧ (location ismeet-
ing room)→ PEMSA(PEAlice do(MeetMember, CustInfo,
read))
[MP4]: (requester’s location is meeting room)→ PEMSA(PEBob
do(MeetMember,Docs, print))
[MP5]: True → PEMSA(PEBob do(MeetMember, CustInfo,
read))
[MP6]: ¬ (requester’s location is company)→ OBMSA(IMBob do
(Any, CustInfo,write)).
We set the security enforcement system for the collaborative
meeting room to enforce the security policies, based on the
disjunctive administration of MSA, on behalf of each meeting
member. In our case, this means that the authority that results
from the disjunctive composition of MSA, on behalf of Alice and
MSA on behalf of Bob, is agreed on for the administration of
the meeting room. Formally, the desired composite authority
is (MSA ◃ Alice)| (MSA ◃ Bob).
Suppose that in the meeting of Alice and Bob, Alice requests
to update a customer’s information through her PDA device.
By her request, she sends a certificate that she is a meeting
member. The security enforcement system, on receiving this
access request, calls FADF to check the read and write accesses
of Alice (as a meeting member) to customers’ information
(CustInfo). Note that the update operation is interpreted to
include read and write operations. The arguments of FADF in
this case are as follows:
FADF ((MSA ◃ Alice)|(MSA ◃ Bob),
MeetMember, CustInfo, read)
FADF ((MSA ◃ Alice)|(MSA ◃ Bob),
MeetMember, CustInfo, write).
Following the policy rules MP3 and MP4, BADF infers the
following statements for the read operation, and so returns
Grant.
PE(MSA◃Alice)|(MSA◃Bob) do(MeetMember, CustInfo, read).
However, the write operation, since it cannot infer neither PE
nor IM, returns Don’t Care. Therefore, in this situation, FADF
grants the read operation and denies the write operation,
following the default strategy for access control (suppose DefSt
= IM).
9. Conclusions
Wide distribution of computational devices in new comput-
ing environments and the tendency to share resources through
different communication channelsmotivate us to have a decen-
tralized approach to their security administration. To this end,
the proper approach is to have multiple security domains inwhich an environment is apportioned into several security do-
mains. In each security domain, an authority specifies security
policy rules of the resources that are registered in the domain,
and a Security Agent (SA) derives and enforces the applicable
authorization and obligation policy rules.
In this paper, an overall cooperation framework for Multi-
Security-Domain (MSD) environments is introduced in which
the issue of cooperative security administration in cooperative
domains is at the center of concerns. In the formal definition of
MSD, presented in this paper, cooperative domains are shared
or subdomains, which can be managed cooperatively by the
authorities.
In order to state security policies and enforce them in indi-
vidual and cooperative domains, a logical policy specification
language, called MASL, is proposed in this paper. MASL is based
on a many-sorted type of multi-authority version of deontic
logic. It enables policy specification by multiple authorities in
an MSD environment. It also enables security agents of security
domains to infer implicit security policy rules based on the co-
operative administration style that is agreed upon by the partic-
ipating domains’ authorities. The inference of such policy rules
is obtained in MASL by calculus of the cooperative security ad-
ministration, which is proposed as a supplement toMASL’s core
logical system.
The calculus of cooperative administration, proposed in this
paper, offers three styles of cooperative administration, includ-
ing disjunctive, delegative, and collaborative administration.
Disjunctive administration acts based on the union of the norms
of the authorities participated in the shared domain’s adminis-
tration. Delegative administration is used to infer policy rules
that are stated by an authority on behalf of another authority.
In the collaborative administration, we proposed a more strict
approach in whichwe based on the intersection of the norms of
the participating authorities manage the shared domain. These
three styles of cooperative administration are realized in this
paper through the introduction of different types of composite
authorities.
The logical language for specifying security policies and
inferring composite authorities’ policies is presented in this
paper, in terms of syntax, proof theory (axioms and inference
rules) and semantics. The semantics are presented using a
Kripke stylemodel. The soundness of the proposed proof theory
is proven and its completeness is discussed and proved for
a fragment of MASL without a collaboration operator (named
MASL&− ).
As an evaluation of the proposed logical approach to
cooperative security administration in MSD environments
(within the proposed framework), we can enumerate the
following characteristics:
• Abstractness:MASL is a logical abstract language that enables
specification and cooperative administration inference,
independent of the heterogeneity of systems in MSD
environments.
• Expressiveness: using the proposed logical language, we can
easily specify different types of security policy, such as
discretionary or DAC policies, mandatory or MAC policies,
identity-based or IBAC policies, and credential-based or
CBAC policies. We do not prove the expressiveness of MASL
in this paper.
• Inference ability: automatic policy inference for coopera-
tive administration is the main feature of the proposed
approach.
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the distributed nature of the proposed MSD framework, and
automatic inference of policy rules for cooperative admin-
istration of shared and subdomains are the characteristics
that are taken into account to obtain the fully decentralized
security model for new computing environments.
• Scalability: the distributed nature of the proposedmodel and
policy language makes this approach completely scalable
and independent of the size of the environment.
• Applicability: the proposed framework with the proposed
architecture of security agents (with access control and
obligation enforcement subsystems) and the studied case in
a sample pervasive environment (introduced in the Oxygen
project), shows the applicability and usage of the proposed
approach in real cases.
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